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JURISDICTION OVER NON-INDIANS:
AN OPINION OF THE "OPINION"
William R. Baldassin*
and
John T. McDermott**
On August io, 1970, Mitchell Melich, Solicitor of the Department
of Interior, issued an "opinion" with regard to the question of tribal
jurisdiction over non-Indians.1 The three-page opinion concludes:
"Indian tribes do not possess criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians,
such jurisdiction lies in either the state or Federal governments."'
This "opinion," and the Bureau of Indian Affairs policy which
spawned it,' has been a major impediment to the full exercise of tribal
sovereignty. Although the opinion is based almost exclusively on
dicta found in an early circuit court decision,4 it has seldom, until
quite recently, been challenged.5
But times have changed-even if the Department of Interior
hasn't. Modem reservation Indians are demanding a larger role in
the government of their reservations. A number of Indian tribes6
have recently amended their constitutions and law and order codes
so as to authorize the exercise of criminal jurisdiction over all of-
fenses7 occurring on the reservation, regardless of the offender's or
the victim's race.8 Other tribes are contemplating similar changes. 9
Thus, the exercise of tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians is not a dead
issue, as the Solicitor would have us believe. It is in fact one of the
most important issues in Indian law today. The purpose of this short
article is to emphasize that the Solicitor's Opinion is just that-an
opinion, and that while the opinions of administrative agencies often
are given great weight by the courts, this particular opinion is en-
titled to little, if any, weight.
The Opinion reaches the conclusion that Indian tribes do not
possess criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians unless a specific treaty
provision can be found which gives such jurisdiction to a particular
tribe. This conclusion is reached on the basis of only two pieces of
authority: one federal circuit court case, Ex parte Kenyon,10 and the
narrow, conflicting interpretation of a federal statute, i8 U.S.C. §
1152. This paucity of authority takes on added significance when it
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is realized that the Opinion was written in 197o, almost one hundred
years after the decision in Kenyon.
Ex parte Kenyon
In that case, the petitioner (Kenyon) was born of white parents
and lived in Connecticut and Missouri prior to moving to the Chero-
kee Nation. After moving to Indian country, Kenyon married Mollie
Cobb, a Cherokee Indian. They lived together until she died six years
later. After her death, Kenyon took her property and their children
and moved to Kansas. Among the property he took with him to
Kansas was a mare which had belonged to Mollie, but which Kenyon
had "broke" and used as his own during their marriage. He pledged
the animal for a time to secure a debt, but later redeemed it and
continued to use it as his own. He apparently returned to the Chero-
kee Nation'- and was charged and convicted by the Circuit Court
for the Coowees-Coowee District, Cherokee Nation, of the crime
of larceny for taking and converting the mare to his own use.12 He
then petitioned the federal court for a writ of habeas corpus on the
ground that the Indian court was without jurisdiction to convict him
for the crime charged.
The federal court examined the jurisdiction of the tribal court
from three different points of view: (i) jurisdiction over the per-
son, (2) jurisdiction over the place, and (3) jurisdiction over the acts
committed. In reaching its decision, the court held that a federal
court has the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to run in the
Cherokee Nation and Indian Territory; that the acts for which Ken-
yon was convicted by the Cherokee court were committed outside
of the territorial jurisdiction of the Cherokee Nation; and that the
Cherokee courts had jurisdiction only over Indian defendants.
It must be emphasized that the first two holdings adequately sup-
port the writ of habeas corpus.'8 The court concluded that the lar-
ceny (if one was committed) occurred when Kenyon parted with
possession of the horse, and then redeemed it and converted it to his
own use.' 4 This act occurred in Kansas and the tribal court did not
have subject matter jurisdiction over the crime as it occurred beyond
the territorial jurisdiction of the Cherokee court. As the court itself
pointed out: "This alone would be conclusive of this case."
It is clear, then, that the alternative holding that the Cherokee
court lacked jurisdiction because Kenyon was a non-Indian' is mere-
ly dicta as the United States Supreme Court acknowledged in Elk
v. Wilkins.'6 In that case, the third ground for the Kenyon decision
(lack of jurisdiction over non-Indian defendants), was rejected by
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the Court, which held that the second ground (lack of subject
matter jurisdiction) was itself sufficient to settle the case and to
show that Kenyon was entitled to be released from custody.
The Statutory Basis
For statutory authority for his opinion, the Solicitor relies on i8
U.S.C. 1152:
Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the general laws of
the United States as to the punishment of offenses committed in any
place within the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States,
except the District of Columbia, shall extend to the Indian country.
This section shall not extend to offenses committed by one Indian
against the person or property of another Indian, nor to any Indian
committing any offense in the Indian country who has been pun-
ished by the local law of the tribe, or to any case, where, by treaty
stipulations, the exclusive jurisdiction over such offenses is or may
be secured to the Indian tribes respectively."
The Opinion reaches the conclusion that the intent of Congress
as to the meaning of this statute is perfectly clear: the federal courts
have exclusive jurisdiction over all crimes committed in Indian coun-
try except those committed by one Indian against another (some
of which are also within the exclusive jurisdiction of federal courts
under the so-called Major Crimes Act,"'), and those over which
exclusive jurisdiction is secured by treaty to a particular Indian tribe.
However, the United States Supreme Court has repudiated the ex-
clusivity of the statute. In United States v. McBratney,9 and Draper
v. United States,20 the Court read a major exception into the lan-
guage of Section 1152, by holding that a crime committed in Indian
country by one non-Indian against the person of another non-Indian
was within the jurisdiction of state courts even where the state en-
abling act and constitution contained an express disclaimer of juris-
diction over Indian land. These decisions clearly point out the
fallaciousness and inconsistency of the Opinion, for the Solicitor
suggests that to decide the issue of Indian jurisdiction over non-
Indian offenders, one need only look to i8 U.S.C. 1152, which places
such jurisdiction "exclusively" in the federal government. However,
the Solicitor also recognizes that federal jurisdiction under ii 52 is
not "exclusive" at all. One can only wonder how the Solicitor can,
in good conscience, conclude that federal jurisdiction can be both
exclusive and non-exclusive at the same time under the same statute.
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A consistent reading of L8 U.S.C. 1152 would require one of two
results. Either McBratney and Draper are ignored and federal juris-
diction over crimes committed within Indian country is exclusive-
exclusive of both state and tribal jurisdiction-or 18 U.S.C. 1152 is
interpreted as giving federal courts concurrent jurisdiction over such
crimes-concurrent with both state and tribal courts. The latter
interpretation is consistent with the only relevant Supreme Court de-
cisions.
We are faced, then, with an Opinion citing only two pieces of
authority: a nineteenth-century federal district court case, from
which dicta alone is relied upon, and a statute, the express terms of
which are no longer applied. One can hardly conceive of a legal argu-
ment propounded or a legal position adhered to on the basis of less
compelling authority.
Tribal Sovereignty
In addition to the basic deficiencies in the Opinion, the entire
history of judicial treatment of Indian tribes militates against the
position taken by the Solicitor. The right of self-government has
been a consistent theme in Supreme Court decisions, even in those
denying tribes the status of a foreign nation. In Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia, 21 Chief Justice Marshall, while denying the Cherokee Na-
tion the status of a foreign state, emphasized that
So much of the argument as was intended to prove the character of
the Cherokees as a state, as a distinct political society, separated from
others, capable of managing its own affairs and governing itself, has,
in the opinion of the majority of the judges, been completely suc-
cessful.
In fact, the Supreme Court has been steadfast in preserving Indian
self-government from encroachment by the states.
The whole course of judicial decision on the nature of Indian
tribal powers is marked by these principles:
(1) An Indian tribe, in the first instance, possesses all the powers
of a sovereign nation.22
(2) Conquest renders the tribe subject to the legislative powers
of the United States and, in substance, terminates the external pow-
ers of sovereignty in the tribe, e.g., its powers to enter into treaties
with foreign nations, but does not by itself affect the internal sov-
ereignty of the tribe.2 3
(3) These powers are subject to qualification by treaties and by
legislation of Congress, but legislation does not apply to Indians
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unless so expressed as to clearly manifest as intention to include
them. 4
(4) Doubtful expressions in the acts of Congress relating to In-
dians are to be resolved in favor of the Indians. 5
If one accepts the principle that Indians retain their internal
sovereignty, one simply cannot accept the conclusion reached in the
Opinion. Internal sovereignty cannot be said to exist if the "sov-
ereign" does not have the right and power to control the internal
security of its lands and its people. A tribe can be sovereign if, and
only if, it has the right to establish rules for the conduct of people
within its boundaries, and to punish those who violate the rules,
regardless of who they are.
The fourth principle also negates the conclusion reached by the
Solicitor. There can be little doubt that Section 3-152, as construed
by the Supreme Court, constitutes a "doubtful expression in an act
of Congress." As such, it must be resolved in such a way as to expand
rather than to contract the extent of the tribe's power-a position
directly contrary to that advanced in the Opinion.
One of the earliest Supreme Court decisions involving jurisdiction
over Indians was the case of Ex parte Crow Dog.26 The Supreme
Court held that the murder of one Sioux by another on the reserva-
tion was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sioux tribe, and that
Crow Dog could not be punished by the United States. The United
States attempted to assert jurisdiction on the basis of a treaty which
provided that "Congress shall, by appropriate legislation, secure to
[the Sioux] an orderly government; they shall be subject to the laws
of the United States, and each individual shall be protected in his
rights of property, person, and life." Discussing this clause the Court
said,
It is equally clear, in our opinion, that these words can have no such
effect as that claimed for them. The pledge to secure to these people,
with whom the United States was contracting as a distinct political
body, an orderly government, by appropriate legislation thereafter to
be framed and enacted, necessarily implies, having regard to all the
circumstances attending the transaction, that among the arts of
civilized life, which it was the very purpose of all these arrangements
to introduce and naturalize among them, was the highest and best
of all, that of self-government, the regulation by themselves of their
own domestic affairs, the maintenance of order and peace among
their own members by the administration of their own laws and
customs. (Crow Dog, supra at 568.)
This decision caused so much consternation that Congress en-
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acted the Seven Major Crimes Act, 7 but this does not blunt the
impact of the Court's language. The tribe should be allowed to pro-
mote and protect its internal peace and security. This can only be
done by permitting the tribe to regulate all conduct on its reserva-
tion. 8
The Indian Reorganization Act 9
The Solicitor observed in the Opinion that many tribes, in organ-
izing under the IRA, limited the criminal jurisdiction of their courts
to tribal members.30 However, the Solicitor did not discuss the full
impact of the Wheeler-Howard Act on the question presented to
him. However, a prior Solicitor opined that section 16 of the
Wheeler-Howard Act gave Indian tribes the following powers:
(1) The power to adopt a form of government, to create various
offices and to prescribe the duties thereof, to provide for the manner
of election and removal of tribal officers, to prescribe the procedure
for the tribal council and subordinate committees or councils, to
provide for the salaries or expenses of tribal officers and other ex-
penses of public business, and, in general, to prescribe the forms
through which the will of the tribe is to be executed.
(6) To remove or to exclude from the limits of the reservation
non-members of the tribe, excepting authorized government of-
ficials and other persons now occupying reservation lands under law-
ful authority, and to prescribe appropriate rules and regulations gov-
erning such removal and exclusion, and governing the conditions
under which non-members of the tribe may come upon tribal land
or have dealings with tribal members, providing such acts are con-
sistent with Federal laws governing trade with the Indian tribes.
(8) To administer justice with respect to all disputes and offenses
of or among the members of the tribe, other than the ten major
crimes reserved to the Federal Courts.31
That Opinion, rendered at a time when the Department of Interior
was truly concerned with the preservation of Indian tribes and In-
dian people, clearly supports the exercise of jurisdiction over non-
Indians by tribes "organized" under the Wheeler-Howard Act.
The first element of sovereignty, and perhaps the last to survive
successive statutory limitations of Indian tribal power, is the power
of the tribe to determine and define the powers and duties of its
3.8
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officials, the manner of their appointment or election, the manner of
their removal, the rules they are to observe in their capacity as of-
ficials, and the forms and procedures which are to attest the authori-
tative character of the acts done in the name of the tribe. This power,
unless coupled with jurisdiction over non-Indians, is a hollow one
indeed. What benefit is there in the ability to define one's own form
of government, when that government, once formed, is severely
limited in its power? How effective is the ability to structure the gov-
emnment when that government only has the power to prescribe rules
and regulations for some, but not all of the people on the reserva-
tion? What kind of government is it that cannot protect its people
at all times and in all situations?
The power of an Indian tribe to exclude non-members of the tribe
from entering into the reservation was first clearly formulated in an
opinion of the Attorney General rendered in 1821.32 Two grounds
for this power of exclusion are generally asserted: First, the Indian
tribe may exercise over all tribal property3 the rights of a landowner;
second, the tribe may, in the exercise of local self-government, regu-
late the relations between its members and other persons, so far as
maybe consistent with congressional legislation. Again, the existence
of this power seems contradictory to the lack of jurisdiction over
non-Indian criminal offenders. Could Congress have intended to
exclude non-Indians from the reservation but deny it the power to
regulate their conduct if admitted? Perhaps the tribe should deny
admittance to all non-Indians, thereby avoiding the question alto-
gether.
So long as the complete and independent sovereignty of an Indian
tribe was recognized, its criminal jurisdiction, no less than its civil
jurisdiction, was that of any sovereign power. It might punish its
subjects for offenses against the peace and dignity of the tribe. Simi-
larly, it might punish aliens within its jurisdiction according to its
own laws and customs. Such jurisdiction continues to this day, save
as it has been expressly limited by Congress. The Opinion incor-
rectly concludes that Section 13.52 is such a limitation.
The result is that if an Indian commits an offense on the reserva-
tion, he is subject to the tribe's jurisdiction. However, if a non-Indian
commits the same offense on the reservation, he is not subject to the
jurisdiction of the tribe. Similarly, if an Indian and a non-Indian are
accomplices or participants in the same crime, one can be arrested
and prosecuted by the tribe while the other is now only subject to
state or federal prosecution. The inefficiency, inconsistency, and
potential unfairness of such a tri-faceted system of justice is all too
apparent. It is inconceivable that Congress intended such a result.
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To the contrary, Congress, through the Wheeler-Howard Act, clear-
ly gave Indian tribes the power to form strong independent govern-
ments with full authority to regulate their internal affairs, including
the authority to regulate the conduct of non-Indians on the reserva-
tion .34
Conclusion
Perhaps the most basic principle of all Indian law is the principle
that those powers which are lawfully vested in the tribe are not
delegated powers conferred by Congress, but rather inherent powers
which have never been extinguished. It is a general rule, judicially
recognized, that it is only by positive enactments, even in the case
of conquered or subdued nations, that their laws are changed by
the conqueror.3 5 The inherent powers of Indian tribes are far more
extensive than have been recognized and exercised in the past.30 The
time has come to recognize the full power and authority of tribal
governments to regulate all conduct within the boundaries of the
reservation.
NOTES
i. The opinion, M-3681o, 77 I.D. 113, was requested by the National Council
on Indian Opportunity, and the request was transmitted to the Secretary of Interior
by the Vice President of the United States.
2. 7 7 Id.at" 5 .
3. It is no secret that the BIA has continually discouraged Indian tribes from
exercising their inherent sovereignty by giving restrictive interpretations to treaties
and acts of Congress. See 7 Op. Atty. Gen. 174 (1855) and Federal Indian Law,
Interior Department (1958) at 447-48. It therefore comes as no surprise that the
United States recently urged that the opening of the Cheyenne River Reservation
to homesteading in 19o8 changed the boundaries of the reservation; see, U.S. v.
Erickson, 478 F.zd 684 (8th Cir. 1973) and that state courts rather than tribal courts
have jurisdiction to grant divorces to reservation Indians, see State ex Tel Iron Bear
v. District Court, 512 P.2d 1292 (Mont. 1973).
4. Ex parte Kenyon, 34 Fed. Cas. 353 (C.C.W.D. Ark. 1878 ).
5. This decision was followed by the same court five years later. Ex parte Morgan,
2o Fed. 298, 308 (D.C.W.D. Ark. 1883). There have been no decisions directly in
point since then. This hiatus is due in part to the fact that tribal courts were abolished
by the Curtis Act in 1898 and were not reinstated until after the Indian Reorganization
Act of 1934 was implemented by many Indian tribes.
6. E.g., the Salt River Pima Maricopa Indian Community, Gila River Indian Com-
munity in Arizona, and the Yakima Indian Tribe in Washington.
7- Most tribes seem to reluctantly concede the exclusivity of federal jurisdiction
over the so-called major crimes under i8 U.S.C. 1153.
8. The United States Supreme Court continues to recognize the broad jurisdiction
of tribal courts over civil matters involving non-Indians. Kennerly v. District Court,
400 U.S. 423, 91 S.Ct. 480, 27 L.Ed.zd 507 (1971); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S.
217,79 S.Ct. 269,3 L.Ed. 251 (1958).
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9. E.g., an early draft of the proposed new Blackfeet Tribal Constitution provides
for the exercise of criminal jurisdiction over all persons within the boundaries of the
reservation. The Northern Cheyenne Tribal Council is considering a somewhat
different approach; it has adopted an ordinance which provides for the permanent
expulsion of any non-Indian committing a crime on their reservation.
1o. A trial court decision-apparently never appealed; not to be confused with a
decision of what used to be referred to as United States Circuit Court of Appeals.
ii. The court's decision does not indicate whether Kenyon's return was voluntary
or whether he was brought back by tribal authorities.
12. He was sentenced to be confined in the penitentiary of the Cherokee Nation
at Tahlequah for the period of five years.
13. The first holding is now moot; the 1968 Civil Rights Act specifically makes
federal habeas corpus available to test the validity of a tribal court judgment and
sentence. 25 U.S.C. § 1303. The second holding-that tribal courts do not have
jurisdiction over crimes committed off the reservation-is not disputed.
14. Kenyon committed no crime when he took the horse with him to Kansas. The
court found he had lawful possession of the mare during the life of his wife, the true
owner of the horse, and after her death, at least until letters of administration were
taken out on her estate, which was not done before he left for Kansas.
i 5 . Kenyon had apparently become an adopted Indian himself by having married
a Cherokee. The court apparently found that he lost his status as an Indian by leaving
his domicile in Indian country and establishing a new domicile in Kansas. But it was
not the fact that Kenyon was Indian by adoption rather than birth that convinced
the federal court that the Indian court had no jurisdiction over him. It was Judge
Parker's opinion that "Ewhen the members of a tribe of Indians scatter themselves
among the citizens of the United States, and live among the people of the United
States, they are merged in the mass of our people, owing complete allegiance to the
government of the United States and of the state where they may reside, and, equally
with the citizens of the United States and of the several states, subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the courts thereof." Thus, the dicta in Ex parte Kenyon is not that Indian
courts lack jurisdiction over non-Indians, but rather that Indian courts lack jurisdic-
tion over members (natural or adopted) who have established a domicile off the
reservation. Although such a view of Indian "citizenship" was adopted by some
courts, see State v. Monroe, 274 P. 840 (Mont. 1929); it has been thoroughly dis-
credited. Statev. Phelps, 19 P.zd 319 (Mont. 1933).
16. 1zU.S. 9 4, io8 (1884).
17. This statute is based on Revised Statutes of 1873, §§ 2144, 2145, and
2146. Section 2146 was cited and relied upon by the court in Kenyon.
18. 18U.S.C.11 53.
19. 1o4 U.S. 6z1 (1882).
20. 164 U.S. 240 (1896).
21. Chreokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) I (1831), 8 L.Ed. 25 (1832).
22. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 8 L.Ed. 483 (1832); it should
be remembered that Reverend Worcester was white.
23. United States v. Kagama, 318 U.S. 375, 6 S.Ct. 1109, 30 L.Ed. 228 (1886).
24. Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 5 S.Ct. 41, 28 L.Ed. 643 (1884).
25. Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 50 S.Ct. 121, 74 L.Ed. 478 (1930); Squire
v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1, 76 S.Ct. 611, 1oo L.Ed. 883 (1956).
26. Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 3 S.Ct. 396, 27 L.Ed. 030 (1883).
27. 6z STAT. 758, now amended and codified as 18 U.S.C. § 1153.
28. Many Indian leaders feel that federal enforcement of the "major crimes" on
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their reservations has generally been inept. This was one of the major conclusions
reached at the Conference on the Indian Justice Systems held in Aspen, Colo., this
past June.
29. Also known as the Wheeler-Howard Act. 48 Stat. 987 (1934).
3o. This is rather typical BIA "bootstrapping." Field Solicitors advise tribal leaders
that tribal governments lack jurisdiction over non-Indians; the Indian leaders there-
fore pass laws limited to members, and the Solicitor points to such laws as evidence
that the tribes lack jurisdiction over non-members.
A similar type of bootstrapping recently surfaced with regard to federal services
for off-reservation Indians. It has been the BIAs position that it has little if any
responsi lity for off-reservation Indians. When it seeks appropriations under the
Snyder Act, it limits its request for funds to those necessary for assisting reservation
Indians. When sued by an off-reservation Indian, the BIA responds, "We cannot
provide services to off-reservation Indians because Congress only gives us funds for
Reservation Indians." The self-serving nature of this "logic" was rejected in Ruiz
v. Morton, 46z F.2d 818 (9 th Cir. 1972). cert. granted 411 U.S. 947 (1973).
31. "Opinion of the Solicitor for the Department of the Interior on Powers of In-
dian Tribes," 55 I.D. 14 (1934).
32. 1. Op. Atty. Gen. 465,466.
33. A federal court has recently recognized the authority of tribal game wardens
to arrest non-Indians hunting on the reservation without a tribal permit and to seize
their weapons even in a state (California) which has civil and criminal jurisdiction
over Indians on their own reservations under Public Law 28o. The court reasoned that
the Indians' exclusive right to hunt and fish on their land gave them the right to
prohibit others from hunting and fishing without tribal authority, which in turn gave
tribal officials the authority to arrest non-Indians hunting without permission.
Quechan Tribe v. Rowe, 350 F. Supp. 1o6 (S.D. Cal. 1972).
34. Non-Indians need not fear arbitrary or discriminating treatment from tribal
courts as they will come within the protection of the Indian Bill of Rights, 25 U.S.C.
1302.
35- Wall v. Williams, 8 Ala. 48, 51 (1844).
36. The full extent of the tribe's civil jurisdiction is only beginning to be recog-
nized. See, e.g., State of Arizona ex rel Merrill v. Turtle, 413 F.2d 683 (9th Cir.
1969); Security State Bank v. Pierre, 511 P.2d 325 (Mont. 1973 ).
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol1/iss1/6
